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Abstract
Anthropologists approach law as a form of normative ordering that includes rules and processes. The anthropology of law has
evolved significantly from viewing law as a measure of civilization and savagery to understanding law as an emergent cultural
feature and form of power. Contemporary anthropologists investigate law ethnographically, by looking at disputes in spaces
that lack formal legal institutions and codified law, as well as in the institutional sites where law is produced. Plural legal
orders, each invested with particular modes of authority, are seen as a feature of all societies. With the growth of globalization
and transnational law, anthropology has extended its scope to explore the dialectical interaction between these multiscalar
forms of law.
Anthropologists approach law from a comparative perspective
and examine it in social context. ‘Law’ refers broadly to the
rules, processes, and norms that regulate social life. Although
there are frequently institutionalized systems for making deci-
sions and enforcing them, legal anthropology does not restrict
its attention to formal systems of courts or to the law of the
nation-state. Anthropological approaches to law examine the
legal ordering of villages, bands, and urban neighborhoods –
places that usually lack specialized legal institutions and
codified rules – as well as a wide range of institutional systems
and technologies of law.
The anthropological study of law began from nineteenth-
century evolutionary theories in which the form of law
revealed the stage of social development. Twentieth-century
legal anthropology examines processes of resolving disputes
and maintaining social order on multiple scales. While inter-
pretive approaches differ, law is understood as a form of
power, invested with particular forms of authority. Recent
scholarship has examined the relationship between law and
culture, with special attention to the role of language. In
examining law through its broader social and normative
contexts, anthropologists have focused on the legal complexity
produced by intersections among plural legal orders rooted in
the community, the state, and international institutions and
agents.
Historical Developments in the Anthropology of Law
The great nineteenth-century theorists of social evolution
understood law as a measure of civilization and savagery. In
Ancient Law, Sir Henry Maine (1861) theorized that with the
transformation from kin-based to territorially based socie-
ties, law shifted its normative basis from status to contract.
Similarly, sociological theorists such as Émile Durkheim
and Marcel Mauss suggested that law emerged from an
embedded form of repressive sanctions to an instrument
arranged by specialized tribunals and functionaries that
serves to maintain cooperation. These early theories identi-
fied law as a key facet of civilization, raising questions about
the universality of law and the different forms it may take
within distinct social and cultural contexts. As British social
anthropologists pioneered the ethnographic method, they
took up these questions and debated the very definition
of law.
During the early twentieth century, two major schools of
thought developed. One school followed from the work of
Bronislaw Malinowski (1926), who defined law in functional
terms, identifying it with a broad range of social processes
that produce social conformity through social pressure and
inducement. Through his fieldwork in the Trobriand Islands,
Malinowski located law within the domain of everyday life,
rather than the state or other institutions. He defined law in
terms of the relationships of reciprocity that he argued were
a fundamental mechanism for maintaining social control.
With Malinowski’s definition, every society has law. Critics of
this view contend that defining law as social control is too
broad and includes practices such as gossip, ostracism, and
shaming that are not lawlike.
A second school took a more structural approach to define
law in terms of institutions, requiring socially authoritative
mechanisms for enforcing rules through the imposition of
sanctions. Radcliffe-Brown pioneered this perspective, defining
law as “social control through the systematic application of the
force of politically organized society” (1933, p. 202). Under
this definition, all societies have customs and sanctions, but
not all societies have law. E.A. Hoebel defined law more
broadly, but also within an institutional context, as “the
legitimate use of physical coercion by a socially authorized
agent” (1954, p. 26). In The Cheyenne Way, Hoebel and legal
scholar Karl Llewellyn developed a case-method approach
to look at ‘trouble cases’ (1941). This early collaboration
demonstrated the importance of anthropological approaches
for legal scholars and other social scientists. As progressive
legal scholars associated with the legal realist school critiqued
formalist or positivist jurisprudence – the then-dominant
paradigm among legal scholars and practitioners – they turned
to anthropologists to demonstrate the cultural effects of law.
Critics of this view of law, however, argue that this rule-based
perspective is based on Western conceptions of law (Comaroff
and Roberts, 1981, pp. 6–7).
Between the 1930s and 1960s, anthropologists sought to
describe the nature of rules of whole societies. For example,
Isaac Schapera attempted to develop an entire casebook of
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Tswana law based on his ethnographic research, while Leopold
Pospisil sought to provide a more far-reaching universalistic
definition of law based on his fieldwork with the Kapauku
Papuans. Yet these scholars confronted the paradox that there
were frequently discrepancies between these rules and everyday
forms of behavior. Moreover, anthropologists debated the
very nature of the comparative method?. While Max Gluckman
argued that indigenous legal concepts processes could be
translated into the terms of Western jurisprudence, Paul
Bohannan countered that these terms could be understood
only in reference to the total social and legal systems of which
they were a part. This debate, which went to the heart of the
definition of law and the nature of legal comparison, became
increasingly sterile. By the 1970s, this debate was largely
abandoned in favor of understanding law as a social process
(see Moore, 1973; Nader, 1997).
Law and Dispute Processes
In the early 1970s, anthropologists turned to studying processes
by which conflicts are handled and resolutions achieved (see
Moore, 1978). Laura Nader and her students researched how
litigants pursued disputes and how these disputes were
resolved in a wide variety of societies (Nader and Todd, 1978).
This approach used extended case study analysis and
emphasized the perspective of litigants rather than judges.
It broke dramatically with the earlier focus on rules and
looked instead at the processes by which individuals
pursued grievances. At the same time, it built on a tradition of
analyzing extended case studies in the context of social
relationships. For example, Max Gluckman argued that close-
knit villages tended to have compromise settlement processes,
while more loose-knit ones favored more adversarial processes
(Gluckman, 1973). The focus on dispute processes remains
a basic framework for the anthropology of law.
By the early 1980s, however, it became clear that a focus on
the processes of resolving conflicts could not be separated from
a consideration of rules and how they were formed. In their
study of the Tswana, Comaroff and Roberts found that the
meaning and relevance of rules are negotiated in disputes
(1981, pp. 5–17). Arguments among disputants are framed by
rules, but the content of rules is negotiated as disputes are
argued and resolved (1981, p. 19). This more interactive
understanding of rules and processes has proved valuable for
examining the operation of law in communities as well as in
more formal settings, such as courts. It led to an approach
that conceptualized law as more deeply embedded within
culture, as a system that was both constituted by and
constructive of social meaning.
Law, Culture, and Language
The legal system of a society reflects its fundamental values
and its normative order (Rosen, 1989). Geertz (1983) describes
law as a form of ‘local knowledge’ that is ‘a distinct way of
imagining the real.’ In developing an interpretive, compara-
tive approach, Geertz argues that anthropological analyzes
should approach law as a normative process of social
representation. Law is not merely constitutive of social
reality, but also reflects particular ideals of justice. To capture
this dialectic, Geertz suggests that the comparative study of
law should consist of the study of ‘cultural translation.’ In
analyzing this process of translation, anthropologists have
pointed out that law is essentially a language and that legal
procedures are fundamentally linguistic.
Following a processual model of analyzing law, Sally
Humphreys (1985) suggests that law can be studied as a form
of discourse that is embedded in particular notions of power.
Taking up this approach, scholars developed a focus on law and
language that combines sociolinguistic analysis and law and
society scholarship to look at the way that law creates meanings
and exercises power through linguistic exchanges in courtrooms
and other legal settings (Conley and O’Barr, 2005). This work
provides a way to look at the detailed interactions that
determine how the law exercises power. For example, many
features of the kinds of talk that are persuasive in American
courtrooms are more characteristic of male than female
speakers, and of powerful rather than powerless speakers, so
that male litigants in these courtrooms have an advantage
(Conley and O’Barr, 2005). Analyzing the microdiscourses that
take place in mediation centers, courtrooms, and other legal
settings, scholars have applied insights drawn from linguistic
anthropology, such as conversation analysis, to show how
macrosociological relations of power are constituted through
techniques such as controlling silences and suppressing
arguments.
Legal language and institutions also offer avenues for
resistance. In particular, the language of rights has proved
a powerful framework for social justice movements, especially
since the end of the Cold War. Rights talk has been central to
labor movements, indigenous people’s movements, the anti-
apartheid movement in South Africa, and movements for
women’s rights, to name a few examples. Local groups around
the world now draw on global conceptions of human rights
for inspiration. Much contemporary social justice talk and
activism take place within the domain of law. Anthropologists
have questioned whether the proliferation of formal rights
language offers a useful form of resistance in the diverse and
complex struggles that individuals and groups are engaged in
to contest culturally constituted inequalities in diverse regions
of the world. Merry’s (2006a) investigation of the Convention
to End All Forms of Discrimination against Women focused
on the ways that elites translate between the vernacular
language of duties and responsibilities and the global
language of human rights. Although human rights must be
vernacularized to effectively change relationships of power
within a given society, she argues, the language of human
rights nevertheless “comes with a price. Human rights
promote ideas of individual autonomy, quality, choice and
secularism even when these ideas differ from prevailing
cultural norms” (2006a, p. 4). This work has described the
deeply embedded cultural and political conceptions within
legal language as well as the limits of legal language as
a form of social representation (Hastrup, 2003). As the
language of law is deployed within different cultural milieus,
anthropologists have attended to the ways that people
wrestle with the legal categories through which they must
make their claims.
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Anthropologists have also drawn from linguistic anthro-
pology to track the ways in which law serves as a particular
ideology that is embedded within normative epistemologies.
Elizabeth Mertz describes how the pedagogy of US law schools
serves to socialize law students into a particular, ‘culturally
driven model of justice.’ Students are systematically ‘urged to
pay attention more to abstract categories and legal (rather than
social) contexts’ that serve to cultivate the authority of textual
analysis and legal form (2007, p. 5). Mertz shows while legal
language and processes offer a creative system for handling
disputes, they may also privilege particular cultural viewpoints
over others. Similarly, Justin Richland (2008) describes how
language ideologies often conflict within Hopi jurisprudence.
While he too notes how legal language serves to socialize
a particular population into the ideology of law, he also
shows how these ideologies may be transformed over time
through mutually constitutive interaction with divergent
worldviews. Through close linguistic and interactional analysis
within a Hopi courtroom, Richland examines the way in
which Hopi judges and lawyers attempt to develop a Hopi
form of jurisprudence based on ‘tradition.’ He suggests that
Hopi law and ideas about tradition are constituted through
a dialectical tension between Hopi and Anglo-American
concepts of objectivity and forms of narrative.
Law and Power
The law also provides a rich vocabulary for describing and
legitimating relationships of unequal power. It contributes in
significant ways to the hegemony of a political system by
engendering consent and fostering legitimacy for its exercise of
power (see Nader, 1991). Since the 1980s, the anthropology of
law has become concerned increasingly with the relationship
between law and the exercise of power (see Starr and Collier,
1989). Inspired by Marxist and Foucauldian theories as well as
the Critical Legal Studies Movement in law schools that argued
that law reflects the interests of dominant groups rather than
simply the logic of legal reasoning, anthropologists examined
the way law supports relations of power in a wide range of
social contexts (see Lazarus-Black and Hirsch, 1994). However,
this research also demonstrated how law challenges dominant
groups. It showed law to be a double-edged sword, expressing
the rules and sanctioning authority of established political
authorities and at the same time offering opportunities and
justifications for resisting political authorities.
For example, social movements that call on civil rights, such
as the US civil rights movement against racial discrimination in
the 1950s and 1960s, challenge existing power hierarchies.
Feminists have used the criminal law to challenge male privi-
lege by demanding penal sanctions for those who use violence
against women in intimate relationships. The discourse of
human rights has been deployed by indigenous peoples,
women, victims of war atrocities, prisoners of war, and many
other groups to claim protection from state authorities. Thus,
law usually reinforces existing power arrangements, but can
provide an avenue of resistance through its institutions and the
discourse of rights.
Attention to the way that legal forms and institutions
exercise and legitimate power, while offering a mode of
resistance, leads to concerns with the way that laws are
produced and enforced as well as with the linguistic and social
exchanges that take place in courtrooms, police stations, and
lawyers’ offices (e.g., Conley and O’Barr, 1990). Increasingly,
anthropologists have examined the technologies and forms of
law itself. Rosemary Coombe (1998) analyzes the regime
of international property law to reveal the underlying
conceptions of individualism and agency implicit within
these laws. She documents how, as Canadian First Nations
engage with the language of intellectual property laws to
contest the ‘cultural appropriation’ of native knowledge
and symbols, they also resist its underlying possessive
individualism. Indigenous groups deploy a ‘double-voiced
rhetoric,’ whereby “they empty tropes of a dominant
language simultaneously engaging and subverting these
metaphors through the character of the alternative claims
they make into the voice of an authorial other” (1998, p. 242).
Another approach to understanding law and power inte-
grates insights from Science and Technology Studies to
examine the content, form, and agents involved in the
production of legality as a technology and network. This
approach does not focus directly on the relations of power that
underlie law-making processes. Instead, it shows how tech-
nologies of law, in the form of doctrine, interpretive tech-
niques, or dispute resolution tools, produce forms of
knowledge that conceal more substantive, political issues. Both
Bruno Latour (2010), in his study of the French Conseil d’État,
and Annelise Riles (2001), in her study of Fijian activists
negotiating human rights language for the United Nations
Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995, seek to open
up the ‘black box’ of law. This is Latour’s term for complex
techniques that scientists present in diagrams as taken for
granted rather than present in detail. Latour and Riles both
analyze the details of legal processes to show how
technologies of lawmaking become tools to overcome
political and epistemological limits. Whether studying the
objectivity of judges or the use of ‘bracketing’ as a way to
move past substantive disputes in the United Nations, each
of these technologies produces knowledge that is translated
into commonplace understandings. Similarly, Merry (2011)
examines new tools of international governance, such as
the use of quantitative indicators to measure qualitative
categories such as ‘the rule of law,’ as technologies that
transform political decisions into scientific, empirical
knowledge (see also Davis et al., 2012).
Scholars have also looked to the way that law imposes new
forms of power through constructing and transforming notions
of space. Drawing on the work of cultural geographers, these
studies recognize space as a key constituent of social life that
plays an important role in the construction of social relation-
ships and the formation of the political domain. Since law is
the apparatus through which states define political territories,
as well as their domestic and public spheres, it is a key form
through which space is made (see Law and Geography). Benda-
Beckmann et al. (2009) explore the relationship between
competing spatial configurations of law within plural legal
orders. By exploring the plural legal orders and their
particular notions of space, they argue that “multiple legal
constructions of space open up multiple arenas for the
exercise of political authority, the localization of rights and
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obligations, as well as the creation of social relationships and
institutions that are characterized by different degrees of
abstraction, different temporalities and moral connotations”
(2009, p. 4).
Legal Consciousness and Identity
Anthropologists have investigated the relationship between
law and power in the construction of personhood and
subjectivity. Law constitutes social identities and understand-
ings of social relationships through its regulations and
through the spectacular as well as the mundane processes of
arrest, trial, and mediation through which these regulations
are enforced and failure to comply is punished. Even when
laws do not impinge directly on social life, they exercise power
by shaping individuals’ legal consciousness. This refers to the
way in which people see themselves defined by and within
law, the rights they can assert, and their entitlement to seek
legal remedies for grievances in studies of legal consciousness,
anthropologists use disputes to investigate these matters.
These studies approach disputing as “a contest over meanings
in which the law provides one possible set of meanings. The
process of disputing is one of quarreling over interpretations
of social relationships and events” (Merry, 1990, p. 6). Studies
of legal consciousness illuminate the way that everyday
understandings of law become important factors in the
development of ‘community’ and social relations. Merry’s
work on working-class, urban legal consciousness showed
how law becomes a means for challenging hierarchies of
power and asserting privacy in opposition to social conflicts
or constraints engendered by other forms of informal
ordering. Similarly, in a collaborative effort to investigate the
role of law in three American towns, Carol Greenhouse et al.
(1994) suggest that law is a social practice that constructs
the meaning of ‘community’ by defining ‘insiders’ and
‘outsiders.’ Exploring the reasons for litigation within their
three respective sites of study, the authors found that law
was either interpreted as a sign of difference and ‘outsider’
status, or as a form of ‘insider’ status by those seeking to
defend the ‘community.’ Hence, they use the disputing
approach to demonstrate the important role that law plays
in constituting notions of community.
More recent studies of legal consciousness by scholars in
other disciplines explore how people perceive injustice,
understand themselves as rights-bearing subjects, and develop
their identity based on new rights. Ewick and Silbey (1998)
describe the schemas, or positional stances, that individuals
develop to understand their relationship to the law. Laura Beth-
Nielsen’s (2000) research examines the everyday attitudes and
understandings of law as a way of dealing with sexual
harassment. David Engel and Frank Munger (2003) analyze
how the disability rights movement constructs identities
around what it means to be disabled and when and why
disabled people mobilize these rights. David Engel and
Jaruwan Engel (2010) document a surprising shift in legal
consciousness concerning personal injury cases in Thailand as
ordinary people turn away from the law.
Anthropologists have also focused on the way in which legal
ideologies constitute conceptions of subjectivity that shape
identity claims and understandings of the self. Lawparticipates in
the construction of identity by soliciting specific expressions of
difference. By constraining the types of claims that can be made,
Collier et al. (1996) contend that the law sanctions particular
types of identity making. Rather than recognizing all difference
as socially produced, they suggest that legal mechanisms
recognize only those claims that translate their identity into
‘natural’ categories. Thus, formal legal mechanisms do not
recognize the types of difference that law itself has produced.
This is a contradiction that anthropologists have documented
as groups seek remedies for state and social discrimination by
state courts. For example, James Clifford (1988) describes how
the Mashpee struggled for recognition as a ‘tribe’ under the
Non-Intercourse Act in the United States. In this case, the court
became a site to adjudicate a group’s collective sense of identity
based on legal categories rather than the self-understanding of
the community.
Land claims have proved a particularly important site for
anthropologists to investigate the relationship between identity
and law.ElizabethPovinelli (2002)describeshowaboriginal land
claims in Australia require authentic indigenous subjects who are
“called on to perform an authentic difference in exchange for the
good feelings of the nation and the reparative legislation of the
state” (2002, p. 6). Yet there is an inherent contradiction,
a ‘cunning of recognition,’ in that as the state recognizes
aboriginal people and difference more broadly, it defines what
constitutes an appropriate form of difference. People and
groups must therefore represent themselves through these
categories in order to win recognition of their legal rights. This,
the process of recognition, extends the reach of liberal legalism.
Jan French’s study of Brazil (2009) shows how recognized
categories of indigenity alter the lived experiences of people
who adopt legally recognized categories for identity, reshaping
their social relationships and claims to land.
The intersections between law and identity are increasingly
central issues in the anthropology of law. Law constrains and
limits identity claims by granting or denying citizenship to
people who travel across transnational boundaries. The
complex relationship that ensues when the law seeks to erase
past forms of identification and construct new relationships
to the state via identity is the focus for Susan Coutin’s (2000,
2003) and Barbara Yngvesson’s (2010) works, but in
different contexts. Coutin’s research on Guatemalan and
Salvadoran immigrants to the United States and Yngvesson’s
research on transnational adoption both explore the ways in
which adoptees and immigrants must reconcile forms of
identity no longer recognized by law. These authors show the
power and authority of law as an epistemological regime that
confers particular forms of ‘truth’ to individuals in the
process of self-making. Not only does law define identity, as
Yngvesson (2006) and Coutin (2000) and both together
(Coutin and Yngvesson, 2008; Yngvesson and Coutin, 2008)
demonstrate, but also, as borders shift, identities can change
even as people remain in place. Tobias Kelly’s (2004, 2006)
analysis of residents of the West Bank in Palestine illustrates
this phenomenon vividly. With the development of research
on legal consciousness, the relationships among legal culture,
legal consciousness, and legal identity are increasingly
complicated and overlapping, requiring clear definitions of
terms (Merry, 2012).
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Legal Pluralism
In the contemporary world, societies typically have more than
one legal system. Legal pluralism refers to situations of legal
coexistence in a single social field (Merry, 1988). Initially
described in colonial situations, in which the colonial power
superimposed a European legal system over an existing
indigenous system, legal pluralism is now understood as
a fundamental characteristic of all legal systems. Early
insights into legal pluralism within advanced capitalist states
were drawn from Sally Falk Moore’s (1978) description of
semiautonomous social fields, domains of social life that are
self-regulated but also subject to larger forms of regulation,
such as commercial networks or criminal communities. Legal
pluralism has since been used to understand the multiple
layers of regulation developed out of both private and public
forms of governance. For example, many institutions such
as schools and corporations develop forms of private
governance. Informal but rule-governed relationships are
also characteristic of families, communities, and voluntary
organizations, although there is considerable debate about
whether such forms of normative ordering should be called
law. The term ‘interlegality’ emphasizes the interactions
among multiple legal orderings (De Sousa Santos, 1987).
Early descriptions of plural legal systems examined each in
isolation, but more recent work emphasizes the way that plural
systems shape one another. Typically, plural legal systems are
shaped by differing relations of power. In colonial situations,
the colonial authority often established one legal system for
the subjugated and another for the colonial authorities
(Moore, 1986; Merry, 2000). However, as anthropologists
examine postcolonial and contemporary international forms
of governance, they focus on interactions among legal
systems and their impact on litigants and on each other. For
example, Richard Wilson’s study of the South African Truth
and Reconciliation Commission argues that the plural legal
systems in South Africa represent different forms of authority
and approaches to dealing with past injuries. Taking
a processual approach, he suggests that studies of legal
pluralism should focus on the way that the state and other
actors seek to legitimate legal orders within the broader
context of state formation and resistance (Wilson, 2001).
Globalization increases legal pluralism in two ways. First, it
fosters the circulation of legal forms and practices from one
nation-state to another. Constitutions, codes, and legal insti-
tutions are commonly transplanted, much as they were during
the earlier period of colonialism. These transplants introduce
codes and procedures quite different from those of the
receiving society, often with the intention of reform. Colonial
transplants characteristically were phrased as furthering civili-
zation, mid-twentieth-century transplants as modernizing
institutions, and late twentieth-century ones as promoting
democracy and the rule of law. Ugo Mattei and Laura Nader
(2008) argue that in the post–Cold War era, the ‘rule of law’
has been promoted as a nonpolitical, nondistributive
technology that lacks the institutional virtues of democracy
promotion that were central to efforts of Third World
development during the Cold War. As such, the export of
rule of law, they argue, has been a proxy for privatization
and neoliberalization.
The growing field of ‘transitional justice,’ which refers to the
wide array of processes and formal mechanisms that states
establish to deal with past mass human rights violations,
constitutes another form of legal pluralism. Transitional justice
processes seek to reconstitute the state and restore the rule of
law as a necessary precondition for democratic transition. Over
the last two decades, several formalized approaches to transi-
tional justice have been created. These approaches include
criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, reparations, lustra-
tion, and memorialization. In theory, these approaches
are complementary. States may choose to apply multiple
approaches at one time, or may use several approaches
successively. These approaches are used in a wide variety of
political environments ranging from military dictatorships to
ethnic civil wars. The field of transitional justice has engen-
dered a large cadre of professionals who do this work around
the world.
Considerable anthropological research in the field of
human rights and transitional justice focuses on the way these
global justice systems operate in practice. Anthropologists
tend to link local ethnographic research with examinations of
the global institutions promoting human rights and interna-
tional justice. Mark Goodale (2009) explores the history of
anthropology’s engagement with human rights, while
Hinton and O’Neill (2009) offer a series of anthropological
perspectives on the way that local communities in many
parts of the world experience transitional justice in response
to genocide. Harri Englund’s (2006) study of the way that
human rights are understood and used in Malawi provides
valuable insights into the difficulties of translating and
implementing human rights in situations of autocracy and
political opposition. Kimberly Theidon (2012) examines the
workings of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation
Commission from the perspective of highland Peruvians
who suffered from the violence of the period of struggles
between the Shining Path and government soldiers. Kamari
Clarke’s (2009) analysis of the International Criminal Court
takes a local as well as a global perspective on the kinds of
justice that this new international regime provides,
suggesting that its local practice differs from its global
aspirations. Ethnographic studies of the meanings of human
rights in local communities show that they are one discourse
among many, and often not the dominant one. For example,
Daniel Goldstein (2012) shows how concerns about security
take precedence over human rights in a poor urban neigh-
borhood in Bolivia.
Secondly, globalization increases legal pluralism by con-
structing a global legal order that exists outside state law. As
international law and international organizations expand,
legal pluralism provides a valuable analytical framework for
understanding this broadening range of legal forms. The
human rights system, made up of rules and sanctioning
systems embedded in international institutions such as the
United Nations, is a central facet of the new global legal order
(see Human Rights, Anthropology of). Although the human
rights system is a multilateral treaty regime built on a system of
sovereign states, it is redefining the nature of state sovereignty
itself. Pressure for compliance with human rights by states and
transnational nongovernmental organizations is circum-
scribing state sovereignty to some extent. At the same time,
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domestic actors such as indigenous peoples seek to constrain
state sovereignty as they make claims for legal and political
autonomy using international principles of self-determination
and rights to protection of culture.
Anthropological research explores the processes by which
human rights categories are constructed. For example, Tobias
Kelly (2011) examines a series of settings in which legal
institutions determine whether or not a person has been
tortured as a way of understanding what torture means. He
shows that the category is constructed through social
processes rather than through a preexisting definition.
Richard Wilson (2011) takes a similar approach in his
analysis of the way in which international criminal tribunals
generate historical accounts of war crimes and genocide by
looking closely at the operation of the International Criminal
Court.
Another form of transnational law that legal pluralism has
been used to understand is the expanding field of international
commercial law, which includes a wide range of mechanisms
from formal treaties to informal law based on nonbinding
agreements to corporate self-governance. Finally, the creation
of new regional legal entities such as the European Union is
also exploding the autonomy of local legal orders (Darian-
Smith, 1999).
As anthropologists turn their attention to these trans-
national legal orders, they have expanded and further devel-
oped ethnographic methods to analyze intersecting legal
orders on multiple scales through ‘multisited’ ethnography
(Marcus, 1995; Merry, 2006b). Multisited ethnography,
including sites that are vertically connected local and global
spaces, enables anthropologists to explore the many ways in
which both separate legal orders and the ‘local’ and ‘global’
are not opposing entities, but rather mutually constitutive
social fields.
Conclusion
The anthropology of law changed dramatically over the
twentieth century. While earlier theories saw law as a struc-
tural feature of a whole society and used it to classify societies,
more recent anthropological studies examine dispute pro-
cessing, the linguistic and cultural features of legal settings
that shape the way power is exercised, and the extent to which
legal categories and concepts are embedded in individual
consciousness and local culture. At the same time, the notion
of culture as an integrated, homogeneous, and consensual
system has been replaced by models of law in society that
focus on the multiple and contradictory nature of rules and
procedures. Contests among these systems of power and
symbolism account for social change. Some of the competing
frameworks are the product of alternative systems of legal
regulation developed through colonialism or globalization.
Contemporary legal anthropology views law as the product of
contestation about meanings and identities in social fields
constituted by multiple legalities. It examines the way that law
exercises power and sees this process as mediated by legal
procedures, linguistic forms and exchanges, and cultural
practices that shape legal settings and provide individuals with
access to these settings.
See also: Colonialism, Anthropology of; Human Rights,
Anthropology of; Law and Geography; Law and Society:
Development of the Field; Legal Culture and Legal
Consciousness; Science and Technology, Anthropology of.
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